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Language is an enormously effective means of communica-
tion, and it might appear that human communicative abilities 
are just a subset of linguistic skills. In fact, the cognitive and 
evolutionary relation between language and communication is 
actively debated (Carruthers, 2002; Levinson, 2006; Newton 
& de Villiers, 2007; Tomasello, 2008; Tomasello, Carpenter, 
Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005; Varley & Siegal, 2000). In this 
report, we address a crucial element of this debate, namely, 
whether linguistic and communicative abilities are linked by 
their reliance on mentalizing, the capacity to deal with mental 
states of other people (Frith & Frith, 2006; Newton & de Villiers, 
2007; Varley & Siegal, 2000).
Some scholars have argued for the primacy of linguistic 
skills in supporting the cognitive architecture of human men-
talizing abilities (Carruthers, 2002; Newton & de Villiers, 
2007). For instance, Newton and de Villiers showed that per-
formance on a mentalizing task (false-belief task) was impaired 
when paired with verbal shadowing, but was not impaired 
when paired with rhythmic finger tapping. The authors sug-
gested that taxing the language system via verbal shadowing 
hindered performance on the false-belief task and that there-
fore language is needed for mentalizing. Contrary evidence 
comes from aphasic patients with severely impaired linguistic 
abilities, who nonetheless perform well on mentalizing tasks 
(Varley & Siegal, 2000).
In this study, we contributed to this debate by asking 
whether the generation of communicative intentions relies on 
the same cognitive mechanisms that support mentalizing abili-
ties (Frith & Frith, 2006; Levinson, 2006; Tomasello, 2008; 
Tomasello et al., 2005). We hypothesized that mentalizing is 
essential for selecting communicative actions, and more spe-
cifically, that it is essential for adapting communicative behav-
ior to what an interlocutor knows and believes (Clark, 1996). 
If the mentalizing abilities used during communicative 
behavior are related to the language system (Carruthers, 2002; 
Newton & de Villiers, 2007), there should be overlap between 
cerebral structures supporting mentalizing and linguistic pro-
cesses. Previous studies of mentalizing reported activations 
in language-related brain areas (Sassa et al., 2007; Tylén, 
Wallentin, & Roepstorff, 2009), and studies of language reported 
activations in the mentalizing network (Ferstl, Neumann, 
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Abstract
Although language is an effective vehicle for communication, it is unclear how linguistic and communicative abilities relate to 
each other. Some researchers have argued that communicative message generation involves perspective taking (mentalizing), 
and—crucially—that mentalizing depends on language. We employed a verbal communication paradigm to directly test whether 
the generation of a communicative action relies on mentalizing and whether the cerebral bases of communicative message 
generation are distinct from parts of cortex sensitive to linguistic variables. We found that dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, 
a brain area consistently associated with mentalizing, was sensitive to the communicative intent of utterances, irrespective 
of linguistic difficulty. In contrast, left inferior frontal cortex, an area known to be involved in language, was sensitive to the 
linguistic demands of utterances, but not to communicative intent. These findings show that communicative and linguistic 
abilities rely on cerebrally (and computationally) distinct mechanisms.
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Bogler, & von Cramon, 2008; Mason & Just, 2006). However, 
those studies were not designed to dissociate mentalizing and 
linguistic effects. In our study, we independently manipulated 
communicative intent and linguistic processing to directly test 
whether the neurocognitive bases of communicative and lin-
guistic abilities are distinct, and how they relate to mentalizing 
(Levinson, 2006; Tomasello, 2008; Tomasello et al., 2005).
We measured cerebral activity (with functional magnetic 
resonance imaging, fMRI) while healthy participants engaged 
in a verbal communication task. We compared brain states 
during the generation of utterances differing in communica-
tive intent and investigated how these cerebral responses were 
modulated by linguistic difficulty. If the generation of a com-
municative act for a specific agent (audience design; Clark, 
1996) involves mentalizing, then cerebral structures previ-
ously associated with mentalizing (medial prefrontal cortex; 
posterior superior temporal sulcus, or pSTS; and temporo-
parietal junction; Frith & Frith, 2006) should be sensitive to 
the subjects’ communicative intent. Furthermore, if linguistic 
abilities are dependent upon communicative abilities, then 
activity in these mentalizing-related structures should be mod-
ulated by linguistic difficulty. Alternatively, if communicative 
and linguistic capacities are supported by cognitively distinct 
mechanisms, then different cerebral structures should be sen-
sitive to communicative intent and linguistic difficulty.
Method
Participants
Twenty healthy right-handed participants (16 female and 4 
male; mean age = 22 years, range = 18–30) without known 
neurological history, dyslexia, or hearing complaints, and with 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, took part in the study. 
All participants had Dutch as their mother tongue.
Procedure
Participants (senders) were asked to describe concepts (target 
words; e.g., “beard”) to another person (the receiver, a confeder-
ate) by using a single sentence and avoiding prespecified words 
(taboo words; e.g., “chin,” “man,” “hair,” “shave”). The sender 
and receiver could clearly hear each other’s utterances (by means 
of magnetic-resonance-imaging-compatible headphones). The 
receiver inferred target words on the basis of the utterances gen-
erated by the sender, who was lying in an MRI scanner.
Experimental design
We independently manipulated communicative intent and lin-
guistic difficulty in a 2 × 2 factorial design. The first factor 
was communicative setting, which involved a manipulation of 
the communicative intent of the speaker. Communicative 
intent was operationalized as the presence or absence of the 
need to convey a specific concept to a specific agent. In 
targeted trials, the sender was told that the receiver did not 
know the target word. In nontargeted trials, the sender was 
told that the receiver already knew the target word. In fact, in 
both trial types, the receiver was a confederate with previous 
knowledge of the target word. The second factor was linguistic 
difficulty. In difficult trials, the taboo words were semantically 
closely related to the target word, and the sender needed to 
build an utterance by searching distant portions of the seman-
tic space surrounding the target word. In easy trials, there was 
a large semantic distance between target and taboo words, and 
the sender could use the semantic space adjacent to the target 
word. For instance, an easy trial could contain target word 
“rainbow” with taboo words “violet,” “four-leaf clover,” 
“poem,” “sound,” and “water.” (Fig. 1a shows a difficult trial.)
The experiment was run in two consecutive sessions: one 
session of targeted trials and one session of nontargeted trials, 
the order of which was counterbalanced across participants. 
Each session contained 30 task trials (15 easy and 15 difficult) 
and 30 control trials, in which the sender was presented a list 
of words to be read and uttered out loud.
Lexical frequency of taboo and target words was matched 
between all conditions (using CELEX; Baayen, Piepenbrock, 
& van Rijn, 1993). Stimulus lists were pseudorandomized to 
avoid having participants describe the same target word in tar-
geted and nontargeted trials. All materials were in Dutch.
Task trials consisted of five phases (Fig. 1b). First, senders 
were presented with taboo and target words and were required 
to plan their utterance. Second, senders uttered their one- 
sentence description, which they had to do within at most 10 s. 
Third, the receiver planned his answer, and fourth, he uttered the 
answer. Fifth, the experimenter provided feedback by present-
ing a green (correct) or red (incorrect) square. In targeted trials, 
the receiver (confederate) gave wrong answers on a prescribed 
set (30%) of trials. A red square was presented after these trials, 
and each such trial was immediately repeated to give the sender 
a second chance to describe the target word (repeat trials). 
Repeat trials were modeled in the fMRI analysis, but were not 
used for statistical inference. In nontargeted trials, the receiver 
did not utter a response, and, hence, there was no Phase 3 in which 
the sender listened to the receiver’s response (Fig. 1b). Feed-
back in nontargeted trials was always a green square (correct).
The sender and receiver pressed a button to proceed from 
one phase of a trial to the next. In the fMRI analysis, we dis-
tinguished the planning phase (Phase 1, of interest) from the 
other phases (not of interest; Noordzij et al., 2009; Toni, 
Schluter, Josephs, Friston, & Passingham, 1999). This allowed 
us to isolate cerebral responses associated with the planning of 
an utterance from artifacts linked to speech production. Par-
ticipants were familiarized with the paradigm by means of five 
practice trials in each communicative setting.
Data acquisition and analysis
Echo-planar images were acquired with an eight-channel 
head coil on a 3-T Siemens magnetic resonance imaging 
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system (repetition time = 2,060 ms; echo time = 30 ms; flip 
angle = 85°, field of view = 224 mm; 31 transversal slices; 
voxel size = 3.5 × 3.5 × 3.5 mm). Preprocessing involved 
realignment by means of rigid body registration, slice timing 
correction to the onset of the first slice, normalization to 
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space, interpolation to 
2 × 2 × 2-mm voxels, and spatial smoothing (8 mm full-width 
at half-maximum).
First-level analysis was done in the context of the general 
linear model and involved a multiple regression analysis with 
regressors describing the planning phases of the different trial 
types (easy, difficult, control) and the speaking and listening 
phases of the sender. Regressors describing repeat trials (in 
targeted setting only) were also included. Magnetic resonance 
disturbances induced by speaking were accounted for by 
including the full Volterra expansions of the scan-by-scan esti-
mated head motion and scan-by-scan average signals from 
outside the brain, white matter, and cerebrospinal fluid as 
regressors (Verhagen, Grol, Dijkerman, & Toni, 2006). Head 
motion never exceeded 3 mm, or 3°.
The second-level group analysis was a factorial design with 
the factors of communicative setting (targeted, nontargeted) 
and linguistic difficulty (easy, difficult). This analysis was 
based on four contrast images from the planning stage for each 
subject: “easy > control” and “difficult > control” indepen-
dently estimated for targeted and nontargeted trials. Correc-
tion for violation of the sphericity assumption was applied 
when appropriate. All results were corrected for multiple com-
parisons by combining a p < .001 voxel-level threshold with a 
cluster extent threshold to obtain a p < .05 whole-brain-cor-
rected significance level (Friston, Holmes, Poline, Price, & 
Frith, 1996). Given our previous work, we assessed the contri-
bution of pSTS (15-mm spherical region of interest with MNI 
coordinates of [50 –42 14] and [–50 –42 14]; Noordzij et al., 
2009) by masking the simple main effect of semantic diffi-
culty during targeted trials with the Communicative Setting × 
Fig. 1. Stimuli and experimental design. An example of a stimulus is shown in (a). In the nontargeted setting, the receiver 
knew the target word (“beard”), and the sender was reminded of that fact by the repetition of the target word on 
the sender’s screen. In the targeted setting, the sender was told that the receiver did not know the target word. The 
illustration of the time course of a trial (b) shows the tasks of the sender and receiver during the five phases of a task 
trial. All functional magnetic resonance imaging analysis focused on the planning phases (Phase 1), in which the sender 
generated a communicative act. All materials were in Dutch.
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Linguistic Difficulty interaction, using small-volume correc-
tion at p < .05.
Behavioral data analysis involved repeated measures anal-
ysis of variance on planning duration, speaking duration, and 
the number of words per description. The factors in these anal-
yses were communicative setting (targeted, nontargeted) and 
linguistic difficulty (easy, difficult).
Posttest
In a separate posttest, we assessed whether the quality of 
senders’ descriptions was influenced by communicative set-
ting or linguistic difficulty. Sixteen new participants listened 
to 192 utterances (equally distributed across conditions) 
from senders in the fMRI experiment, and guessed which 
word was described in each utterance. Semantic distance 
between their answer and the target word was computed using 
a distributional-proximity-based method on a large corpus of 
written Dutch (Van der Plas, 2008). The computation of 
semantic distance gave a number indicating the amount of 
overlap between two words (from 0, indicating no overlap, to 
1, indicating perfect semantic overlap). This additional anal-
ysis allowed us to assess whether the quality of senders’ 
descriptions varied by communicative setting or linguistic 
difficulty.
Results
There were no behavioral differences between targeted and non-
targeted trials, as indexed by planning times, speaking times, or 
number of words used in the utterances (Figs. 2a and 2b; Table 1). 
Moreover, the posttest on the quality of the descriptions showed 
that there was no effect of communicative setting on quality of 
description (Fig. 2c; Table 1). Table 1 presents the results of 
analyses of variance on these behavioral measures.
Despite this behavioral equivalence for targeted and non-
targeted trials, targeted trials evoked stronger responses than 
nontargeted trials in a confined portion of the dorsomedial pre-
frontal cortex (Fig. 3a; Table 2), a region known to be involved 
in tasks requiring mentalizing (Frith & Frith, 2006; Northoff 
et al., 2006), including making inferences about mental states 
of agents different from oneself (Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 
2006). We show that the same area is involved in the genera-
tion of a communicative utterance provided that the recipient 
of that utterance is believed not to have the same knowledge as 
the speaker.1 No areas were sensitive to the opposite contrast 
(nontargeted > targeted trials). Table 2 shows the contrasts 
from a fMRI whole-brain analysis.
As expected, it took senders longer to plan their utterances 
in the difficult trials than in the easy trials (Fig. 2a; Table 1). 
Also, participants in the posttest guessed the target-word 
descriptions from the easy trials more accurately than those 
from the difficult trials (Fig. 2c; Table 1). Activation levels in 
bilateral, but strongly left-lateralized, inferior frontal cortex 
(LIFC, including Brodmann’s areas 44 and 45; Eickhoff et al., 
2005) and bilateral inferior parietal cortex likewise showed 
stronger activation for difficult as compared with easy trials 
(Fig. 3b; Table 2). LIFC is known to be involved in a wide 
variety of language production and comprehension tasks 
(Hagoort, 2005; Vigneau et al., 2006). The opposite contrast 
(easy > difficult trials) led to increased activation levels in 
left dorsal precentral sulcus and left inferior occipital gyrus. 
We had no a priori hypothesis about this comparison and 
Fig. 2. Behavioral results: mean planning duration (a), speaking duration (b), 
and quality of descriptions as determined by the posttest (c), as a function 
of communicative setting (targeted and nontargeted) and linguistic difficulty 
(easy and difficult). For results of statistical analyses, see Table 1. Error bars 
represent standard errors of the mean.
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interpretation of these findings does not add to understanding 
of the main findings.
Finally, the left pSTS showed a supra-additive response 
when semantically difficult communicative problems needed 
to be solved (Communicative Setting × Linguistic Difficulty 
interaction; see Fig. 3c).
Discussion
Our results shed light on two issues concerning the relation-
ship between communicative and linguistic abilities. First, we 
have shown that generating a targeted communicative mes-
sage for a specific other relies on mentalizing capacities. This 
Table 1. Behavioral Results
Measure and effect F df MSE      p    p
rep




 Communicative setting < 1 1, 19 28.69 n.s. .41 .01
 Linguistic difficulty 57.81 1, 19 21.32 < .001 > .99 .75
 Communicative Setting × Linguistic Difficulty < 1 1, 19 7.35 n.s. .60 .05
Speaking time
 Communicative setting 1.35 1, 19 0.53 .26 .68 .07
 Linguistic difficulty 10.55 1, 19 0.25 .004 .97 .36
 Communicative Setting × Linguistic Difficulty < 1 1, 19 0.38 n.s. .58 .04
Number of words
 Communicative setting 2.64 1, 19 4.29 .12 .79 .12
 Linguistic difficulty 1.95 1, 19 0.75 .18 .74 .09
 Communicative Setting × Linguistic Difficulty 1.16 1, 19 1.11 .30 .65 .06
Quality of descriptions
 Communicative setting < 1 1, 15 0.006 n.s. .26 .004
 Linguistic difficulty 4.54 1, 15 0.007 .050 .88 .23
 Communicative Setting × Linguistic Difficulty < 1 1, 15 0.001 n.s. .34 .009
Note: For a graphical representation, see Figure 2.
Fig. 3. Imaging results: brain areas showing differential activity for targeted versus nontargeted trials (a) and difficult versus easy trials (b), and 
the effect of the interaction between communicative setting and linguistic difficulty (c). The accompanying graphs depict the percentage of blood-
oxygenation-level-dependent (BOLD) signal change for task trials relative to control trials. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.  
Asterisks indicate a significant difference in activation. pSTS = posterior superior temporal sulcus; SVC = small volume correction. All results are 
corrected for multiple comparisons at the p < .05 level.
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Table 2. Results of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Whole-Brain Analysis
Coordinates
Contrast and area x y z t (max)    Number of voxels
Targeted > nontargeted
 Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex −2 38 44 4.91 217
Difficult > easy
 Left inferior frontal sulcus −42 34 26 6.07 1,664
 Right inferior frontal sulcus 50 8 24 4.95 233
 Left inferior parietal lobe −34 −50 46 8.25 3,658
 Right inferior parietal lobe 50 −36 46 6.06 1,678
 Left middle frontal sulcus −26 2 60 5.25 211
 Left posterior superior temporal sulcus −64 −46 8 5.02 328
Easy > difficult
 Left dorsal precentral sulcus −32 −24 48 3.86 195
 Left inferior occipital gyrus −10 −80 −2 4.41 339
Note: Coordinates are in Montreal Neurological Institute space. The t value listed for each area is the value for the 
maximally activated voxel in that area. Voxels were 2 × 2 × 2 mm. No areas had greater activation in nontargeted than 
in targeted trials. Displayed are statistically significant differences, corrected for multiple comparisons. See Figure 3 for 
visualization of the results.
is evidence against the notion that communication involves a 
reflex-like mirroring mechanism rooted in the motor system 
(Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Rather, our results support the 
notion that planning an effective communicative act involves 
the generation of social constructs (what an agent supposes his 
or her interlocutors know and believe) that guide selection of 
an appropriate communicative action (Frith & Frith, 2006; 
Levinson, 2006; Toni, de Lange, Noordzij, & Hagoort, 2008). 
Future research should establish that activations in the mental-
izing network are necessary for planning communicative acts, 
and should research the scope of communicative acts that is 
related to the activation of the mentalizing network.
Second, we have provided evidence that the cognitive and 
cerebral mechanisms involved in communication and language 
are distinct. The dorsomedial prefrontal area sensitive to com-
municative intent was not sensitive to linguistic difficulty. An 
opposite pattern of response was observed in inferior frontal 
and inferior parietal cortex, which were indifferent to the com-
municative intent of the utterances being processed (Fig. 3b). 
Given the well-known role of LIFC in language (Hagoort, 
2005; Vigneau et al., 2006; Willems, Özyürek, & Hagoort, 
2007), it is likely that LIFC activation in our study reflected 
increased semantic processing load, phonological processing 
load, or both.2 This interpretation is strengthened by the left-
hemispheric lateralization in our participants, who were right-
handed (Knecht et al., 2000). The bilateral inferior parietal 
cortex activations could be related to increased attentional load 
in difficult trials, rather than linguistic processes per se (Cor-
betta & Shulman, 2002).
Our finding that distinct networks were activated by the com-
municative and linguistic manipulations is not compatible with 
the notion that communicative and mentalizing abilities are ulti-
mately dependent upon language (Carruthers, 2002). The pres-
ent findings might also appear at odds with a study from Newton 
and de Villiers (2007), which found that verbal shadowing, but 
not rhythmic finger tapping, interfered with performance on a 
false-belief task. In fact, as suggested by the authors (p. 578), 
verbal shadowing could have interfered with the phonological 
loop, leading to reduced working memory resources. Accord-
ingly, reduced performance in the false-belief task during verbal 
shadowing could have been a consequence of reduced working 
memory resources, rather than altered linguistic processing.
Our results confirm and extend previous results showing that 
severely aphasic patients can solve mentalizing tasks (Varley & 
Siegal, 2000). Perhaps these patient data are not decisive because 
the “logical form” of language was still intact in these patients 
(Carruthers, 2002). This argument does not apply to our findings 
because the language system was intact in our participants, and 
still we found that separate cerebral systems were sensitive to 
communicative and linguistic effort. Although we argue that com-
municative and language abilities are cerebrally and cognitively 
distinct, we do not deny that these systems interact closely, for 
instance, during discourse comprehension (Mason & Just, 2006).
Finally, we observed an interaction between communicative 
setting and linguistic difficulty in left pSTS. We previously 
observed a similar effect in right pSTS in a visuospatial com-
munication paradigm (Noordzij et al., 2009), which suggests 
that pSTS is influenced by the format of communication (cf. 
Saxe, Xiao, Kovacs, Perrett, & Kanwisher, 2004).
We conclude that the generation of communicative utter-
ances relies on a neurocognitive system that is involved in 
understanding intentions of others, and that is distinct from the 
language system.
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Notes
1. A feedback-related interpretation was not supported: A region-of-
interest analysis indicated that this region was sensitive to negative 
feedback (red square), t(19) = 2.30, p = .02 (Ridderinkhof, Ulls-
perger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004), but not differentially so in the 
two communicative settings (F < 1).
2. For our argument, it is not directly relevant exactly which language-
related processes caused this effect. It is crucial that this area had simi-
lar activation regardless of the communicative intent of the utterances.
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